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NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORTHODOXY
RICHARD B. COLLINS*
I.
Gentlemen of the Foreign Affairs Society and Distin-
guished Guests,
It is a great honor to be asked to speak to you today on the
threshold of a new century. It is also a pleasure to continue as
a student of the Constitution after my retirement from the
Court. Only nine years ago, we marked the centennial of our
Court, but these nine years have seen events of great impor-
tance, many of which President McKinley reviewed in yester-
day's address.
You seek my views on the constitutional power of the fed-
eral government over foreign affairs in relation to the reserved
powers of the states. And you wish to examine the relations
among the three branches of our government regarding the
same subject.
As you know, the Court at the dawn of the century as-
sumed the power to overrule Congress when it exceeds its
powers under the Constitution.1 Of course, the great Chief
Justice had to stretch the Judiciary Act and Article III quite a
bit. But it was masterful to beard the politicians when they
could do no more than complain. The very same decision as-
serted our authority to hold presidents themselves to account.
However, we have used this power with the greatest cir-
cumspection. In foreign affairs law, the Court has yet to over-
turn a treaty or statute or presidential action for invading the
reserved powers of the states. In the field of foreign affairs, we
have stood up for federalism; we have sustained federal power.
We have never found a president to have overreached his con-
stitutional authority in foreign affairs.
Of course, there are limits, and the Court has the power to
enforce them. As Justice Story's great treatise said, "The
power 'to make treaties'. . . cannot be construed to authorize a
destruction of other powers given in the same instrument."2
* Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
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Judge Cooley stated, "No legislative body can delegate to an-
other department of the government.. . the power... to make
laws."3 The opinions of the Court, including some of my own
modest efforts, have often reminded the political branches of
these boundaries to their authorities.
Our century's record of judicial review is centered on prop-
erty. It was again Chief Justice Marshall who launched the
Court on its vigilant task of protecting property against popu-
lar passions4-- just what President Madison had in mind with
his eloquent warning about factions. 5
Over the century, we have most often exercised our power
over Congress in the cause of property rights. In Dred Scott v.
Sandford,6 we denounced federal confiscation of property. Af-
ter the War and the amendments, that doesn't seem to be our
proudest moment. In the Civil Rights Cases,7 we protected the
property rights of owners of theaters, restaurants, and inns.
Just four years ago, we capped the century by scuttling the
dire threat to property rights posed by the demon of a federal
income tax.8 It has been a great century for property rights.
We have looked after property rights in the field of foreign
affairs as well. Dred Scott rejected a treaty claim.9 In 1836,
we stopped federal bureaucrats who were trying to take prop-
erty from the City of New Orleans based on a treaty claim. 10
STATES § 777, at 552-53 (abr. 1833).
3. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 111 (3d ed. 1898).
4. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
6. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
7. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
8. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
9. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 524-25 (Catron, J., concurring) (rejecting Article III
of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty providing for rights of citizens for all "inhabi-
tants of the ceded territory").
10. See New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836). This
was our first recognition of the rule of property that states rather than the fed-
eral government are constitutional heirs to sovereign ownership of the beds and
banks of navigable waterways, while the federal government has regulatory
power over navigation. The ownership rule was more fully developed in Pollard
v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). The problem was how to address pur-
ported exercises of federal power in a territory. The Court evolved the rule that
such acts would be strictly construed against alienation of beds and banks, but
transfers sufficiently clear could be sustained. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894). The federal claim in New Orleans arose after statehood and did not in-
volve any purported federal transfer in a federal territory. It was thus an easy
case under the Pollard rule.
[Vol. 70
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORTHODOXY
And in the same term as Dred Scott, we upheld property rights
of the State of Louisiana against a claim of retroactive im-
pairment by treaty.11 All three decisions were reached by care-
ful interpretation of the treaties to respect property rights.
Yet if a treaty plainly sought to take property without just
compensation, I do not hesitate to say that the Court would
strike it down.
In our vigilance over property rights, we play no favorites
between state and national governments. When states tried to
grab Tory property after the Revolution, or Swiss property in
the 1870s, we upheld treaty rights against them. 12 These trea-
ties are crucial to the reciprocal property rights of our citizens
abroad.
When states tried to ignore or abridge the treaty rights of
Indian nations to control their retained lands, we ruled against
the states. We held that Indian nations within our borders
have the national capacity to make treaties that are valid un-
der the Treaty Clause. 13 Indian treaties have equal dignity
with foreign treaties in domestic law. In our leading judgment
in 1832, we held that "[tihe Cherokee nation ... is a distinct
community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accu-
rately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force."1 4 The supremacy of treaties is firmly established.
Property aside, we have largely left foreign affairs to the
President and Congress, where they belong. On more than one
occasion, we have sustained unreviewable presidential power
to recognize foreign governments. 5 We reached the same con-
clusion for Indian nations within our borders.16
As this Society well knows, we have adopted the rule that
the laws of the United States be interpreted to harmonize with
the law of nations whenever possible.1 7 A related rule calls for
11. See Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1856).
12. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Martin and other judgments sustaining the
Treaty of Paris against state law were the first instances in which the Court sus-
tained federal power under a treaty that could not have been sustained under
other delegated powers.
13. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
15. See, e.g., Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
16. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865).
17. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804).
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federal statutes to be interpreted to harmonize with prior trea-
ties, both international and Indian. 18 But when federal law is
clearly inconsistent, it prevails over the law of nations.19 And
on numerous occasions, we have sustained the power of Con-
gress to override prior treaties.20 These rules protect rights
under treaties and the law of nations against inadvertent over-
ruling by Congress, but they respect political authority to
make the ultimate decision on questions of policy that do not
invade constitutional rights.
You have asked about the power of presidents to make
agreements with foreign nations that are not called treaties
and, therefore, not submitted to the Senate for ratification. To
my knowledge, no such agreement has been challenged in a
case before our Court. Agreements were made by President
Washington and most every chief executive since.2' The prac-
tice is now well established and seems necessary in proper cir-
cumstances. Agreements about where to stable horses at our
embassies should not require the attention of the Senate.
The most frequent subject has been agreements to settle
our citizens' claims against foreign governments. 22 These are
obviously beneficial. I should note that no president has
sought to make an agreement that conflicts with an act of
Congress or that invades the reserved powers of the states or
the property rights of citizens. Each of these would pose a se-
rious question about the validity of a presidential order.
Much of the President's power over foreign affairs is exer-
cised under statutory authority from Congress. This is par-
ticularly true in the vital field of trade and commerce. Just
seven years ago, our Court faced the first challenge to this
practice that accused Congress of having yielded its legislative
power to the President in contravention of the rule against ex-
cessive delegation articulated by Judge Cooley.23 We sustained
18. See Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 60 (1895) (Indian); Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 541 (1884) (international).
19. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
20. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); The Cherokee Tobacco
Cases, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1871).
21. See Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870).
22. See XI Exec. J. 142 (1859); S. EXEC. Doc. No. 36-10, at 472 (1859).
23. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); supra note 3 and accompanying
[Vol. 70
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the statute, as we had a similar law in 1813.24 These statutes,
and many others like them from as early as 1794,25 properly
left the execution of a law to the President; they did not give
him the power to make law.
We have more often faced the question of presidential
lawmaking in domestic cases. Over the century, presidents
have been given or have assumed very broad powers over the
public lands, Indian affairs, and governance of the territories.
26
These are all fields of exclusively federal competence, and it is
largely for Congress to decide how they should be governed.
Your most provocative question asks about possible uses of
foreign affairs powers very different from those customarily
undertaken by our government. My answer invokes Justice
Story. 27 All powers of the government must be exercised with
proper respect to other powers defined by the Constitution. A
treaty cannot amend the Constitution. This is a principle well
understood by the political branches. No president has abused
his foreign affairs powers. There are well-understood subjects
appropriate for presidential authority over foreign affairs, and
every president has respected those limits. Your question
imagines a future president who will not. I have no doubt that
our Court will be equal to that challenge should it arise.
As we look ahead to the twentieth century, there are very
few storm clouds over the law of foreign affairs. Our govern-
ment faces significant challenges to deal with Hawaii and with
the territories acquired in the recent war with Spain. Some
problems may reach our Court. Otherwise the foreign affairs
powers of our government are clearly defined and understood.
They have served the nation well for the century past, and I
am confident they will enjoy continuing utility in the twentieth
century.
Thank you.
II.
Professor Ted White's marvelously thorough review of for-
24. See Field, 143 U.S. at 680-92 (citing The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
382 (1813)).
25. See id. at 683-84.
26. See, e.g., Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363, 380-81 (1867); 17 Op.
Att'y Gen. 258 (1882).
27. See STORY, supra note 2.
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eign affairs constitutionalism, 8 like his previous writings, has
much to teach us. His review of the scholarship of the early
part of this century is particularly interesting.
My fictional speaker of 1899 would surely have rejected
the claim attributed to Justice Sutherland that we may look to
extra-constitutional sources for the foreign relations power.29
The semi-fiction of popular consent to the Constitution does
not extend to any basic law beyond its boundaries. "Congress
and the President, like the courts, possess no power not de-
rived from the Constitution."30 As Justice Story said, the task
is to determine from within the Constitution the extent of the
treaty power and, by extension, every other aspect of foreign
relations powers.3 1
Professor White makes the case that a nineteenth-century
orthodoxy of shared federal and state power over foreign af-
fairs evolved to a 1940s norm of exclusively federal, and mostly
executive, power. 32 This orderly formulation can be questioned
at both ends. The Court's assertions of exclusive power in the
federal government and the Executive were made most
strongly by the Roosevelt Court of the 1940s, at the height of
the New Deal. Like other verities of that period, they have
been qualified and excepted in the decades since.33 A number
of papers at this conference explore this point.
My remarks focus on the contrast between nineteenth-
century orthodoxy and New Deal revisionism. My thesis is
that the constitutional rules of the two periods are less sharply
in conflict than Professor White's paper suggests, as the review
by my 1899 speaker demonstrates.
A. The Treaty Power
There is a strong basis in Supreme Court dicta and schol-
arly argument to support the claim of a sharp change of foreign
28. G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of
Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999).
29. See id. at 6, 46-76.
30. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (Stone, C.J.).
31. See STORY, supra note 2.
32. See generally White, supra note 28. With different ends in mind, Curt
Bradley states the same contrast. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 422-33 (1997).
33. See Bradley, supra note 32, at 433-50.
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affairs doctrine between 1890 and 1940, as Professor White
thoroughly documents. But when we examine judgments and
practices, the differences blur considerably. Despite many
dicta asserting federalism limits on the treaty power, no nine-
teenth-century judgment known to me overturned a treaty on
federalism grounds.34 Federalism influenced treaty interpreta-
tion by nineteenth-century judges,35 and it was less important
to interpretations by the 1940s Court. But that is a pretty
mild doctrinal shift.
The 1899 review also demonstrates that many nineteenth-
century judgments held treaties to have preempted state laws.
The dispute in Worcester v. Georgia36 related to state authority
to punish Worcester and other whites for offenses defined by
state laws that challenged Cherokee sovereignty. The limita-
tion on state authority upheld in the case was serious enough
to produce a significant political backlash.37
On the other hand, when the Court later interpreted Con-
gress's legislative power over Indian affairs, it reached simi-
larly broad conclusions. In United States v. Kagama,3s the
Court sustained Congress's power to delegate to the President
authority to set aside an Indian reservation within the
boundaries of a state by executive order and thus to preempt
state law governing homicide by an Indian. Later, the Court
reached the same conclusion for homicide by a white man
whose victim was Indian. 39
This shows a parallel progression to Missouri v. Holland.40
A federal power first recognized by treaty was later sustained
under the Commerce Clause. Purported treaty exceptionalism
became domesticated.
34. I use "federalism grounds" here in the modern sense to equate with
states' rights limits on federal power. The nineteenth-century usage, employed
by my fictional speaker of 1899, was the opposite. See, e.g., 1 HAMPTON L.
CARSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND ITS
CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION 402 (1891) (referring to Justice Miller as "[a] pro-
nounced Federalist"); 2 id. at 503 (referring to a decision sustaining federal
authority as "[t]he Zenith of Federalism").
35. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
36. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
37. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-84 (1982).
38. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
39. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
40. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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B. Executive Agreements
Much of Professor White's discourse explains the emer-
gence of executive agreements after 1890 and the Court's deci-
sions to recognize them as valid and capable of preempting
state law. It is difficult to contrast his discussion with nine-
teenth-century practice because there was relatively little of it.
And it must be conceded that the caution with which presi-
dents made agreements may reflect their assumption that
their power to do so was doubtful.
However, the void was not total. Samuel Crandall's 1904
book included a heading for "Agreements Concluded by the Ex-
ecutive Independently of the Senate."41 He recited several ex-
amples of these types of agreements and asserted that agree-
ments for the settlement of claims of American citizens against
a foreign government "are not usually submitted to the Sen-
ate," citing fourteen of them.42 His second edition, published in
1916 and cited by Professor White, expanded this section into a
chapter, with many more examples of every sort.43
The nineteenth-century Court had not adjudicated any
conflict between an executive agreement and state law, so
United States v. Belmont44 decided a new question. However,
Belmont and United States v. Pink45 arose out of an established
nineteenth-century practice: the President's exercise of the
power to recognize foreign governments. 46 A number of earlier
decisions had sustained broad presidential power of recogni-
tion, albeit exercised by means other than formal agreement
with the country recognized. 47 The Court announced a similar
41. SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 85-
88 (1904); see also John Bassett Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20
POL. SCI. Q. 385 (1905).
42. CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 86.
43. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCE-
MENT 102-20 (2d ed. 1916); see also Moore, supra note 41.
44. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). See White, supra note 28, at 111-20.
45. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
46. See id.
47. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. These were attempts to have
the courts second-guess presidential recognitions. What power Congress has to
affect the recognition power by legislation has not been tested. Cf. United States
v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348
U.S. 296 (1955) (holding that the President may not make an executive agree-
ment in conflict with a prior federal statute not based on recognition).
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doctrine for presidential recognition of Indian tribes.48 This
subject thus presents a particularly strong basis for preemp-
tion of state law by presidential order. Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan49 is in the same tradition.
C. Legislative Delegations and Executive Orders.
Nineteenth-century presidents made a number of interna-
tional agreements under legislative delegation. Professor
White and my 1899 speaker comment on Field v. Clark,50 in
which the Court upheld a broad congressional delegation of
power to the President against the claim of presidential law-
making. The doctrine of excessive delegation was more often
at issue in domestic law. Here the nineteenth century saw re-
markable examples of broad executive power. Beginning at
least as early as 1855, presidents issued executive orders
withdrawing public lands from sale for such purposes as In-
dian reservations, military reservations, appendages to mili-
tary reservations, and bird reserves.5 1 By 1910, 252 withdraw-
als had been made. All this was done without any statutory
authority, and every withdrawal contravened a general act of
Congress making the land in question available for entry un-
der the homestead or mining laws. In 1909, President Taft
made withdrawals expressly to reserve petroleum and coal
lands. These actions provoked a challenge, but in United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 52 the Court sustained the power on
the basis of congressional acquiescence.
III.
The picture that emerges is that during the nineteenth
century, the Court sustained broad federal foreign affairs pow-
ers and broad presidential powers in a number of cases that
48. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1866) (indi-
cating "it is the rule of this court to follow the executive and other political de-
partments of the government" on tribal recognition). During the period when
presidents made treaties with tribes, each treaty recognized the national charac-
ter of the tribal party. See COHEN, supra note 37, at 62-107.
49. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
50. 143 U.S. 649 (1892); see White, supra note 28, at 15-18, 21; supra notes
23-25 and accompanying text;.
51. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 37, at 127-28.
52. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
1999] 1165
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
supply at least some antecedent support for Missouri v. Hol-
land,3 Belmont,54 and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.5 Despite many limiting dicta, the Court did not over-
turn any presidential or other federal action on constitutional
grounds. What changed between 1890 and 1940 were the
fields in which these powers were exercised. Subjects familiar
to nineteenth-century government, such as comity treaties, In-
dian affairs, and trade treaties, gave way to unique new issues.
But the antecedents were sufficient support to say that the
new decisions should not lte seen as revolutionary.
I wish to end with a brief comment on the current debate
about the extent of foreign affairs powers. Some scholars rely
on the same nineteenth-century evidence discussed in the pre-
vious sections to support an extremely broad reading of federal
foreign affairs powers, albeit not of presidential power. In par-
ticular, they claim that Holland stands for the lack of any
states' rights limits on the treaty power of Congress.56
Professor Curtis Bradley has thoroughly challenged these
arguments. 57 I add only this, really a summary of one of his
points. The broad statements in Missouri v. Holland, Belmont,
Pink, and Curtiss-Wright were made by justices who assumed
traditional uses of the treaty power and reacted to states'
rights arguments that they perceived as mistaken in context.
The urge to establish precedents leads many judicial opinions
into statements of excessive generality. But as soon as the
premises are seen to change, a later court will readily distin-
guish them. In foreign affairs, the premises have changed very
much indeed. Treaties and executive agreements now address
issues that earlier generations had thought were essentially
domestic and thus of central concern to state governments.5 8
New Deal self-confidence has faded with experience, as much
as the hubris of any prior age. We also have a Court that is
less deferential to political judgments at all levels, accustomed
to imposing its own view of the distribution of the sovereign
53. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
54. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
55. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
56. See Bradley, supra note 32, at 393 nn.14-16 (collecting authorities); see
also ELBERT M. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: THEIR SEPARATE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS 128-29, 146 (1960).
57. See Bradley, supra note 32, at 433-61.
58. See id. at 396-99.
1166 [Vol. 70
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powers of the nation.
None of this is to say that the Court will or ought to en-
force significant federalism or separation of powers limits on
Congress or the President in foreign affairs. Modem human
rights arguments have powerful appeal and may prevail. But
they must do so on their own merits, not based on ipse dixits
from the Roosevelt era.
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